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Even though there are many potential alternatives, in reality,
not all of them are given to voters. This is because voters’ set of
choices, the agenda, is created by agenda setters. However, agenda
setters may have a vested interest to set an agenda such that an
outcome they prefer is chosen by voters. The purpose of this study
is to find conditions regarding agenda setters’ preferences under
which voting rules cannot be manipulated by agenda setters. As-
suming that voters’ preferences are single-peaked, we show that,
whenever monetary rewards to agenda setters are not allowed, any
unanimous voting rule is manipulable via agenda setting. We also
show that in a mechanism that gives monetary rewards to agenda
setters, the median rule is non-manipulable via agenda setting if
and only if no agenda setter has a special interest in alternatives.
A policy implication of these results is that agenda setters should
be totally irrelevant to political issues.
Keywords: Agenda setting; Single-peaked preferences; Median
rule; Condorcet winner; Mechanism design.
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Even though there are many potential alternatives, in actuality, not all
of them are given to voters. This is because voters’ set of choices, the
agenda, is created by agenda setters, e.g., political parties that propose
some policies in referendums or committee members who decide which
films to nominate. However, since any alternative outside of the agenda
cannot be chosen by voters, agenda setters may have an incentive to set
an agenda such that an outcome they prefer is chosen.1 This paper finds
conditions regarding agenda setters’ preferences under which such agenda
manipulation does not occur.
Since the seminal works by Black (1948a, b) and Moulin (1980), it
has been well-known that when voters’ preferences are single-peaked, the
median rule is quite an appealing voting rule that satisfies efficiency,
anonymity, and strategy-proofness. Moreover, whenever the entire set of
alternatives is provided to the voters, the median rule selects the Con-
dorcet winner, an alternative that beats any other alternatives in pairwise-
majority comparisons. However, in many real-life political situations,
such a rich set is not given because the agenda is set by agenda setters.
In this case, the median rule outcome may differ from the Condorcet win-
ner. For example, let us suppose that there are two agenda setters and
five voters whose preferences are as illustrated in Figure 1. Each agenda
setter and voter has a single-peaked preference regarding four alterna-
tives: x1, x2, x3, and x4, with x1 < x2 < x3 < x4. For instance, Voter 1
prefers x3 to x2, x2 to x1, and so on. Here, x3 is unanimously supported
by voters, and hence, it is the Condorcet winner. However, let us sup-
pose that agenda setter a1 proposes x1 and agenda setter a2 proposes x2
and that the agenda is composed of these proposed alternatives, {x1, x2}.
Then, since all voters prefer x2 to x1, the median rule, in this case, selects
1For example, in the 2015 Osaka Metropolitan Plan referendum in Osaka city, only
the special wards (tokubetsu-ku) plan favored by the Osaka Restoration Association
was put to a vote, even though the LDP and Komeito had proposed another plan.
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a1 : x1x2x3x4 1 : x3x2x1x4




Figure 1: Single-Peaked Preferences of Agenda Setters and Voters
x2 from this agenda. However, the outcome x2 is not the Condorcet win-
ner x3. Moreover, this pair of proposed alternatives (x1, x2) constitutes
a dominant strategy equilibrium of a game played by agenda setters, i.e.,
neither of them can benefit by proposing another alternative.2
We say that a voting rule is manipulable via agenda setting if an alter-
native that is unanimously supported by voters is not a unique dominant
strategy outcome in the game played by agenda setters. Theorem 1 shows
that whenever monetary rewards to agenda setters are not allowed, any
unanimous voting rule is manipulable via agenda setting. In particular,
this result implies that the median rule is manipulable via agenda setting.
To remove agenda setters’ incentives that may affect the outcome, we next
introduce a mechanism that provides monetary rewards to agenda setters.
In this mechanism, each agenda setter receives a monetary reward r/ℓ if
their proposed alternative is selected by voters and the number of agenda
setters who propose the same selected alternative is ℓ. Conversely, the
agenda setter receives no monetary reward if their proposed alternative is
2To see that x1 is agenda setter a1’s dominant strategy, for example, consider a
case in which agenda setter a1 proposes x3 and agenda setter a2 proposes x2. Then,





not selected by voters. Theorem 2 shows that in this mechanism, the me-
dian rule is non-manipulable via agenda setting if and only if no agenda
setter has a special interest in alternatives, regardless of the size of r.
This paper is related to the seminal work by Downs (1957), which shows
a policy convergence in a two-party competition.3 Although Downs’s pur-
pose is to analyze political parties’ behavior in a two-party system, our
purpose is a bit different. We are interested in finding conditions regard-
ing agenda setters’ preferences under which agenda manipulation does not
occur. The importance of considering the impacts of agenda manipulation
has been widely recognized since the time of McKelvey (1976, 1979).4 In
a multidimensional spatial model, he shows that if only one agenda setter
has complete control over agendas and no Condorcet winner exists, then
this agenda setter can always construct a sequence of binary agendas from
which his ideal alternative is finally selected by voters. Dutta, Jackson,
and Le Breton (2001, 2002) analyze candidates’ incentives to enter or exit
an election such that an alternative they prefer is chosen by voters. The
authors of that study show that the outcome of any unanimous voting
rule is affected by the incentives of candidates to enter or exit the elec-
tion. In contrast to their studies, we analyze agenda setters’ incentives to
propose an alternative such that an alternative that they prefer is chosen
by voters.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides our
model, section 3 presents our main results, and section 4 makes concluding
comments. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
Let [0, 1] be the set of all potential alternatives, A = {a1, a2, . . . , am}
the finite set of agenda setters and I = {1, 2, . . . , n} the finite set of voters.
3As is well-known, Downs’s (1957) discussion dates back to Hotelling (1927).
4For a survey of the agenda manipulation literature, we refer to Ordeshook (1986).
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We assume that |A| = m ≥ 2 and that n is odd.
A single-peaked preference is a complete, transitive, and anti-symmetric
binary relation5 ≿i on [0, 1] such that there exists a best alternative b(≿i)
∈ [0, 1] for which
[x < y < b(≿i) or b(≿i) < y < x] =⇒ b(≿i) ≻i y ≻i x ∀x, y ∈ [0, 1].
Let S be the set of single-peaked preferences. A preference profile of n
voters is as follows:
≿= (≿1,≿2, . . . ,≿n) ∈ S n.
Each agenda setter ak ∈ A proposes an alternative sk ∈ [0, 1], and each
profile of proposed alternatives s ≡ (s1, s2, . . . , sm) ∈ [0, 1]m generates an
agenda {s1, s2, . . . , sm} ⊂ [0, 1]. For each s ∈ [0, 1]m and each ak ∈ A, let
s−k = (s1, . . . , sk−1, sk+1, . . . , sm) ∈ [0, 1]m−1,
and for each s′k ∈ [0, 1], let
(s′k, s−k) = (s1, . . . , sk−1, s
′
k, sk+1, . . . , sm).
For each ≿∈ S n and each s ∈ [0, 1]m, we denote the restriction of ≿
to {s1, s2, . . . , sm} by ≿ |{s1,s2,...,sm}.
Definition 1. A voting rule is a function f : S n × [0, 1]m → [0, 1] such
that
(i) for each ≿∈ S n and each s ∈ [0, 1]m, f(≿, s) ∈ {s1, s2, . . . , sm},
(ii) for each ≿∈ S n and each s, s′ ∈ [0, 1]m, if {s1, s2, . . . , sm} =
{s′1, s′2, . . . , s′m}, then f(≿, s) = f(≿, s′).
5Completeness: for each x, y ∈ [0, 1], either x ≿i y or y ≿i x, Transitivity: for each
x, y, z ∈ [0, 1], x ≿i y and y ≿i z together imply x ≿i z, Anti-symmetry: for each
x, y ∈ [0, 1], x ≿i y and y ≿i x imply x = y. In addition, for each x, y ∈ [0, 1], we write




(iii) for each ≿,≿′∈ S n and each s ∈ [0, 1]m,
[
∀i ∈ I, ≿i |{s1,s2,...,sm} =≿′i |{s1,s2,...,sm}
]
=⇒ f(≿, s) = f(≿′, s).
Condition (i) requires that a voting rule select an alternative from an
agenda. Condition (ii) requires that the voting rule be independent of
which ever agenda setter proposes an alternative. Condition (iii) requires
that the voting rule be independent of voters’ preferences on unproposed
alternatives. Let F be the set of voting rules.
For each ≿i∈ S and each s ∈ [0, 1]m, let b(≿i, s) ∈ {s1, . . . , sm} be i’s
best alternative in {s1, . . . , sm}, that is,
b(≿i, s) ≿i x ∀x ∈ {s1, . . . , sm}.
Definition 2. A voting rule f ∈ F is unanimous if for each ≿∈ S n,
each s ∈ [0, 1]m and each x ∈ {s1, . . . , sm},
[∃x ∈ {s1, . . . , sm}, ∀i ∈ I, b(≿i, s) = x] =⇒ f(≿, s) = x.
The median rule is a voting rule that selects the median alternative in
any given agenda.
Definition 3. The median rule is a voting rule fm ∈ F such that for
each (≿, s) ∈ S n × [0, 1]m,
|{i ∈ I : fm(≿, s) ≥ b(≿i, s)}| ≥
n
2




We now discuss the incentives of agenda setters. Each agenda setter
ak ∈ A is concerned with a voting outcome and the monetary reward he
receives. We assume that each agenda setter ak ∈ A has a quasi-linear
utility function uk : [0, 1]×R → R, i.e., there exists a function vk : [0, 1] →
R such that for each x ∈ [0, 1] and each rk ∈ R, uk(x, rk) = vk(x) + rk.
We also assume that for each ak ∈ A, vk is weakly single-peaked, that is,
there exists x ∈ [0, 1] such that
[z ≤ y ≤ x or x ≤ y ≤ z] =⇒ vk(x) ≥ vk(y) ≥ vk(z) ∀y, z ∈ [0, 1].
6
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We next introduce a mechanism that provides monetary rewards to
agenda setters. For each voting outcome x ∈ [0, 1] and each s ∈ [0, 1]m,






|{ak′ ∈ A : sk′ = x}|
if sk = x,
0 if sk ̸= x,
where r ∈ R+ is the total monetary reward, given by the society. On
the one hand, we can interpret r as the total cost of avoiding agenda
manipulation. On the other hand, we can alternatively interpret r as the
factor of determining the agenda setters’ payoffs of winning measured in
money, i.e., rk(x, s). In the next section, we first consider the case in
which no monetary rewards are provided to agenda setters (r = 0), and
then we consider the case in which some monetary rewards are provided
to agenda setters (r > 0).
For each (f,≿) ∈ F × S n, and each ak ∈ A, sk ∈ [0, 1] is agenda
setter ak’s dominant strategy at (f,≿) if for each s−k ∈ [0, 1]m−1 and



















f(≿, s′k, s−k), s′k, s−k
))
.
Let DSk(f,≿) be the set of agenda setter ak’s dominant strategies at
(f,≿) ∈ F × S n. Then, the set of dominant strategy equilibria at




In this section, we search for conditions regarding agenda setters’ pref-











x ∈ [0, 1] : x = f(≿, s) for some s ∈ DE(f,≿)
}
.
A voting rule is said to be manipulable via agenda setting if an alternative
that is unanimously supported by voters is not a unique dominant strategy
outcome.
Definition 4. A voting rule f ∈ F is manipulable via agenda setting if
there exists ≿∈ S n and x ∈ [0, 1] such that









Our first main result states that whenever monetary rewards to agenda
setters are not allowed, any unanimous voting rule is manipulable via
agenda setting.
Theorem 1. If r = 0, then any unanimous voting rule is manipulable
via agenda setting.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollary 1. If r = 0, then the median rule is manipulable via agenda
setting.
Proof. Immediately follows from Theorem 1.
We next consider a mechanism that provides positive monetary rewards
to agenda setters. For each ≿∈ S n, x ∈ [0, 1] is the Condorcet winner at
≿ if
|{i ∈ I : x ≻i y}| > |{i ∈ I : y ≻i x}| ∀y ∈ [0, 1] \ {x}.
Since the seminal works by Black (1948a, b), it has been well-known that
for each ≿∈ S n, the Condorcet winner exists at ≿. For each ≿∈ S n, let
c(≿) ∈ [0, 1] be the Condorcet winner at ≿.
We say that a voting rule is strongly non-manipulable via agenda setting
if the Condorcet winner is the unique dominant strategy outcome.
8
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Definition 5. A voting rule f ∈ F is strongly non-manipulable via






Note that the notion of strong non-manipulability is even stronger than
the negation of manipulability in Definition 4. Theorem 2 states that the
median rule is strongly non-manipulable via agenda setting if and only if
no agenda setter has a special interest in alternatives. In particular, since
Theorem 2 only requires r > 0, the cost of preventing agenda manipula-
tion can be arbitrarily small.
Theorem 2. Whenever r > 0, the median rule fm is strongly non-
manipulable via agenda setting if and only if for any ak ∈ A and any
x, y ∈ [0, 1], vk(x) = vk(y).
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition of the proof for Theorem 2 is as follows: First, let us
consider the “if” part. Suppose that no agenda setter has a special interest
in alternatives. Consider any ≿∈ S n. Then, for any agenda setter ak ∈
A, proposing the Condorcet winner c(≿) is the unique dominant strategy
because each agenda setter is only concerned with their monetary reward
and the median rule selects the Condorcet winner whenever it is included
in an agenda. Therefore, the Condorcet winner is the unique dominant










= {c(≿)}. Suppose, by contradiction, that there ex-
ists an agenda setter ak ∈ A and an alternative x ∈ (0, 1) such that
vk(x) > vk(0). Consider a profile ≿∈ S n such that 0 is the best alterna-
tive for any voter. Then, 0 is not agenda setter ak’s dominant strategy
because if any agenda setter other than ak proposes 1, then agenda setter




we can also show that any z ∈ [0, 1] \ {0} is not agenda setter ak’s domi-
nant strategy, i.e., agenda setter ak has no dominant strategy. However,





for any ak ∈ A and any x ∈ (0, 1), vk(x) ≤ vk(0). Similar arguments show
that for any ak ∈ A and any x ∈ (0, 1), vk(x) ≥ vk(0), vk(x) ≤ vk(1) and
vk(x) ≥ vk(1). This implies that for any ak ∈ A and any x, y ∈ [0, 1],
vk(x) = vk(y).
4 Conclusion
This paper found conditions regarding agenda setters’ preferences under
which a voting rule is (strongly) non-manipulable via agenda setting.
First, we showed that whenever monetary rewards to agenda setters are
not allowed, any unanimous voting rule is manipulable via agenda setting.
Second, we showed that in a mechanism that provides monetary rewards
to agenda setters, the median rule is strongly non-manipulable via agenda
setting if and only if no agenda setter has a special interest in alternatives.
A policy implication of these results is that agenda setters should be
totally irrelevant to political issues. An interesting future topic would be
to study the case in which agenda setters are also elected by voters.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1:
Take any unanimous voting rule f : S n × [0, 1]m → [0, 1]. Suppose, by
contradiction, that for any ≿∈ S n and any x ∈ [0, 1], if x ≿i y for all





Step 1. For any ak ∈ A and any ≿∈ S n, if x ∈ DSk(f,≿), then
[ x ≿i y ∀i ∈ I, ∀y ∈ [0, 1] ] =⇒ [vk(x) ≥ vk(y) ∀y ∈ [0, 1]] .
10
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Take any ak ∈ A and any ≿∈ S n. Suppose that x ∈ DSk(f,≿) and
x ≿i y for all i ∈ I and all y ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose, by contradiction, that
there exists y ∈ [0, 1] with vk(y) > vk(x). Let s−k ∈ [0, 1]m−1 be such
that s−k = (y, . . . , y︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−1
). Then, f(≿, y, s−k) = y. By unanimity of f ,
f(≿, x, s−k) = x. Thus,
vk(f(≿, y, s−k)) = vk(y) > vk(x) = vk(f(≿, x, s−k)),
a contradiction to x ∈ DSk(f,≿).
Step 2. For any ≿∈ S n, if x ≿i y for all i ∈ I and all y ∈ [0, 1], then
there exists ak ∈ A such that DSk(f,≿) = {x}.
Take any ≿∈ S n. Suppose that x ≿i y for all i ∈ I and all y ∈ [0, 1].
If there exists ak ∈ A with DSk(f,≿) = ∅, then DE(f,≿) = ∅ and
{x} = f(≿,DE(f,≿)) = ∅,
a contradiction. Therefore, for any ak ∈ A, DSk(f,≿) ̸= ∅.
Now, suppose, by contradiction, that for any ak ∈ A, DSk(f,≿) ̸= {x}.
Let s ∈ [0, 1]m be such that for any ak ∈ A, sk ∈ DSk(f,≿) \ {x}. Then,
s ∈ DE(f,≿), and hence
x ̸= f(≿, s) ∈ f(≿,DE(f,≿)),
a contradiction to f(≿,DE(f,≿)) = {x}.
Step 3. For any x ∈ [0, 1], there exists ak(x) ∈ A that satisfies the
following two conditions:
(i) for any y ∈ [0, 1], vk(x)(x) ≥ vk(x)(y),
(ii) for any y ∈ [0, 1] with x > y, vk(x)(x) > vk(x)(y).
Take any x ∈ [0, 1]. Let ≿∈ S n be such that for any i ∈ I, b(≿i) = x




ak(x) ∈ A such that DSk(x)(f,≿) = {x}. Therefore, by Step 1, for any
y ∈ [0, 1], vk(x)(x) ≥ vk(x)(y).
Let us show Condition (ii). Take any y ∈ [0, 1] with x > y. Suppose,
by contradiction, that vk(x)(x) = vk(x)(y). Then, for any z ∈ [y, x],
vk(x)(y) = vk(x)(z) = vk(x)(x).
Let us show that y ∈ DSk(x)(f,≿). Take any s−k(x) ∈ [0, 1]m−1 and
s′k(x) ∈ [0, 1]. Then, by unanimity of f and definition of≿, f(≿, y, s−k(x)) ∈
[y, x]. Thus,
vk(x)(f(≿, y, s−k(x))) = vk(x)(x) ≥ vk(x)(f(≿, s′k(x), s−k(x))).
Therefore, y ∈ DSk(x)(f,≿), a contradiction to DSk(x)(f,≿) = {x}.
Hence vk(x)(x) > vk(x)(y).
Step 4. For any x, y ∈ [0, 1] with x ̸= y, ak(x) ̸= ak(y).
Take any x, y ∈ [0, 1] with x ̸= y. Without loss of generality, suppose
that x > y. Then, by Step 3, vk(x)(x) > vk(x)(y) and vk(y)(y) ≥ vk(y)(x).
Therefore, ak(x) ̸= ak(y).
Steps 3 and 4 imply that there is an injection from [0, 1] to A, a con-
tradiction to |A| = m ∈ N. □
Proof of Theorem 2:
“If” part
Suppose that for any ak ∈ A and any x, y ∈ [0, 1], vk(x) = vk(y).
Step 1. For any ≿∈ S n and any s ∈ [0, 1]m, c(≿) ∈ {s1, s2, . . . , sm}
implies fm(≿, s) = c(≿).
Take any≿∈ S n and any s ∈ [0, 1]m. Suppose that c(≿) ∈ {s1, s2, . . . , sm}.
It suffices to show that for any y ∈ {s1, s2, . . . , sm} \ {fm(≿, s)},
|{i ∈ I : fm(≿, s) ≻i y}| > |{i ∈ I : y ≻i fm(≿, s)}|.
12
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We shall show that for any i ∈ I and any x, y ∈ {s1, . . . , sm},
[x < y < b(≿i, s) or b(≿i, s) < y < x] =⇒ b(≿i, s) ≻i y ≻i x.
Take any i ∈ I and x, y ∈ {s1, . . . , sm}. Suppose that x < y < b(≿i,
s). Let us show that y < b(≿i). Suppose, by contradiction, that b(≿i)
≤ y. Then, by definition of single-peaked preferences, y ≻i b(≿i, s), a
contradiction to definition of b(≿i, s). Thus, x < y < b(≿i). Then, by
definitions of b(≿i, s) and single-peaked preferences, b(≿i, s) ≻i y ≻i x.
A similar argument shows that b(≿i, s) < y < x implies b(≿i, s) ≻i y ≻i
x. Then, since preferences are single-peaked on {s1, s2, . . . , sm}, for any
y ∈ {s1, s2, . . . , sm} \ {fm(≿, s)},
|{i ∈ I : fm(≿, s) ≻i y}| > |{i ∈ I : y ≻i fm(≿, s)}|.
Step 2. For any ≿∈ S n and any ak ∈ A, DSk(fm,≿) = {c(≿)}.
Take any ≿∈ S n and ak ∈ A. We first show that c(≿) ∈ DSk(fm,≿).
Take any s−k ∈ [0, 1]m−1 and any s′k ∈ [0, 1]. Since
c(≿) ∈ {s1, . . . , sk−1, c(≿), sk+1, . . . , sm},
by Step 1,
fm(≿, c(≿), s−k) = c(≿).
Suppose that
|{aℓ ∈ A \ {ak} : sℓ = c(≿)}| = 0.







fm(≿, c(≿), s−k), c(≿), s−k
)
= vk(c(≿)) + r
≥ vk(c(≿)) + rk
(






























fm(≿, s′k, s−k), s′k, s−k
)
.
Suppose that s′k ̸= c(≿). Since |{aℓ ∈ A \ {ak} : sℓ = c(≿)}| > 0, c(≿) ∈
{s1, . . . , sk−1, s′k, sk+1, . . . , sm}. Hence by Step 1, fm(≿, s′k, s−k) = c(≿).











|{aℓ ∈ A \ {ak} : sℓ = c(≿)}|+ 1







fm(≿, s′k, s−k), s′k, s−k
)
.
Thus, c(≿) ∈ DSk(fm,≿).
We next show that for any y ∈ [0, 1]\{c(≿)}, y /∈ DSk(fm,≿). Take any
y ∈ [0, 1]\{c(≿)}. Let s−k ∈ [0, 1]m−1 be such that s−k = (c(≿), . . . , c(≿)︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−1
).



















fm(≿, y, s−k), y, s−k
)
.
Therefore, y /∈ DSk(fm,≿), and hence DSk(fm,≿) = {c(≿)}.
Step 3. For any ≿∈ S n, fm(≿,DE(fm,≿)) = {c(≿)}.
Take any ≿∈ S n. Then, by Step 2, DE(fm,≿) =
{(












Suppose that for any ≿∈ S n,
fm(≿,DE(fm,≿)) = {c(≿)}.
Take any ak ∈ A. Let us show that for any x ∈ (0, 1), vk(x) = vk(0).
Suppose, by contradiction, that there exists x ∈ (0, 1) such that vk(x) ̸=
vk(0). First, we consider the case with vk(x) > vk(0). Let ≿∈ S n be such
that for any i ∈ I, b(≿i) = 0. Then, c(≿) = 0. Let s−k ∈ [0, 1]m−1 be such
that s−k = (1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−1








fm(≿, x, s−k), x, s−k
)
= vk(x) + r







fm(≿, 0, s−k), 0, s−k
)
.
Therefore, 0 /∈ DSk(fm,≿).
Let us show that DSk(f
m,≿) = ∅. Take any y ∈ (0, 1]. Let s−k ∈
[0, 1]m−1 be such that s−k = (0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−1
). Then, fm(≿, 0, s−k) = 0 and
fm(≿, y, s−k) = 0. Thus,
vk(f
m(≿, 0, s−k)) + rk
(







m(≿, y, s−k)) + rk
(
fm(≿, y, s−k), y, s−k
)
.
Therefore, y /∈ DSk(fm,≿), and hence DSk(fm,≿) = ∅. Then DE(fm,≿)
= ∅. It in turn implies that





Next, we consider the case with vk(0) > vk(x). Let ≿∈ S n be such
that for any i ∈ I, b(≿i) = x and 0 ≻i 1. Then, c(≿) = x. Let s−k ∈
[0, 1]m−1 be such that s−k = (1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−1
). Then, fm(≿, 0, s−k) = 0 and
fm(≿, x, s−k) = x. Thus,
vk(f
m(≿, 0, s−k)) + rk
(
fm(≿, 0, s−k), 0, s−k
)
= vk(0) + r
> vk(x) + r
= vk(f
m(≿, x, s−k)) + rk
(
fm(≿, x, s−k), x, s−k
)
.
Therefore, x /∈ DSk(fm,≿).
Let us show that DSk(f
m,≿) = ∅. Take any y ∈ [0, 1] \ {x}. Let
s−k ∈ [0, 1]m−1 be such that s−k = (x, . . . , x︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−1
). Then,
fm(≿, x, s−k) = x and fm(≿, y, s−k) = x.
Thus,
vk(f
m(≿, x, s−k)) + rk
(







m(≿, y, s−k)) + rk
(
fm(≿, y, s−k), y, s−k
)
.
Therefore, y /∈ DSk(fm,≿), and hence DSk(fm,≿) = ∅. Then DE(fm,≿)
= ∅. It in turn implies that
{x} = {c(≿)} = fm(≿,DE(fm,≿)) = ∅,
a contradiction. Therefore, for any x ∈ (0, 1), vk(x) = vk(0). A similar
argument shows that for any x ∈ (0, 1), vk(x) = vk(1). Hence for any
x, y ∈ [0, 1], vk(x) = vk(y), as desired. □
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